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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN CYBERSPACE
This conflict has extended into the cyber arena. We have adapted to changes in the traditional forms of conflict, but we are not yet adequately prepared for this contest. Qaeda continues to recruit, train, and terrorize using the internet to reach out from hidden safe havens. The ability to gain almost perfect knowledge on an individual's or group's demographics and networks is near instantaneous. Potential and actual adversarial state and non-state actors make it a priority to use this technology to influence relevant populations. As the United States explores the potential shortfalls in its cyber strategy, time is critical, as adversaries may reach parity or dominance in their cyber capabilities to challenge the U.S. and its allies at home and abroad.
The technological capability for the United States military to operate in this new domain exists, and recent advances in authorities, doctrine, training, equipping and execution limit enemy infiltration of computer networks; however, the will and authority to implement offensive cyber options fall far behind those of our potential adversaries. The Threat Operating in Cyberspace Today, the most common type of threat comes from groups that wage war from the shadows, using the basic precepts of guerrilla warfare. They understand that the only way to defeat a larger, stronger enemy is to use unconventional tactics, and recent activities indicate their effective use of the cyberspace domain. 3 As the national and defense strategies continue to focus on defensive network measures to defeat this threat, the risk of neglecting our own offensive capabilities increases exponentially.
Adversaries of the United States are effectively using their own forms of Unconventional Warfare in the U.S. to recruit and terrorize from within. Al Qaeda has done this very effectively in recent years. Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Sudan connect online with young men in the United States. 4 The U.S. threat in Cyberspace includes
Americans who travel overseas to the tribal areas of Pakistan, Yemen, or Africa for hands-on training, and then return to the United States. The threat also includes Americans radicalized in their own homes through chat rooms on the Web, finding likeminded people. The enemy can be overseas, or the next-door neighbor. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. The U.S. military must continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities for counter terrorism and irregular warfare, and remain vigilant to threats posed by terrorist organizations.
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The directed mission of "Deter and Defeat Aggression" by any potential adversary requires the U.S. forces to deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace. This includes the ability to secure territory and populations, and facilitate a transition to a stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using a standing force and an extended period with mobilized forces. U.S.
forces committed to a large-scale operation in one region, must be capable of denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. U.S. forces will operate with allied and coalition forces, and ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur. The use of UW in the Cyber domain provides a means to achieve presence and prepositioning for long periods of time, operating by, with and through indigenous forces in one area, while also providing support to a major contingency.
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"Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges" is a mission that directly relates to the use of Unconventional Warfare to gain access to denied areas, while keeping a small, low cost footprint. Both state and non-state actors threaten access and possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and cyber attacks with possible severe effects. 14 In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the U.S. must maintain its ability to project power in areas of limited or denied access. Adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, including electronic and cyber warfare and other methods to complicate operations. The U.S. military must continue to invest to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial environments, including implementation of the Joint Operational Access Concept.
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The mission of "Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space" states that modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. DoD must continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space. 16 The mission description does not mention the use of offensive capabilities within Cyberspace.
The mission of "Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations" must emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations.
U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Since U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, the military must examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans, to place limited resources against mission requirements. This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare. 17 The use of Special Operations Forces utilizing this approach in Cyberspace is a means to accomplish this stability. However, this priority is focused on assuring the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information and the systems that process, store, and transmit information. It focuses on the risk of not meeting information assurance standards or leaving exposed cybersecurity weaknesses. 18 However, once again, the focus is on defense of systems. The total ARCYBER Command strength will exceed 21,000 Soldiers and civilians and the Army must fund it with existing fiscal resources. 55 The Army must continue to prioritize recruitment, development, and retention of Army Cyber experts.
ARCYBERCOM is prioritizing the following: 
